
9 JAN, 2026
By Mutualidad

By Pedro del Pozo, Director of Financial Investments at Mutualidad
The idea that a state could purchase an entire territory in the 21st century is, to say the least, surprising. However, when viewed through the lens of recent – and not so recent – history, this possibility, while certainly rare today, is not entirely unprecedented. The potential purchase of Greenland by the United States – an idea once floated by the Trump administration – invites an interesting reflection from historical, strategic, economic, and geopolitical perspectives.
It is important to note that since the end of World War II, formal territorial purchases have been exceptionally rare. There are a few precedents, such as the case of Pakistan more than fifty years ago, although that was a partial and highly specific transaction. In any case, this is not a common practice in today’s international relations, which are governed by principles of national sovereignty and the self-determination of peoples.
However, if we broaden the scope to the period prior to World War I, such territorial transactions were considerably more common. A clear example can be found in Spain’s recent history: following the loss of the colonies of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, the Spanish government sold the Mariana and Caroline Islands to the German Empire. Likewise, the acquisition of Alaska by the United States in 1867, purchased from Russia for $7.2 million, stands as a paradigmatic case. What may seem unusual today was once a standard tool of territorial configuration and geostrategic expansion.
From this perspective, it must be acknowledged that, from a purely formal standpoint, the purchase of a territory such as Greenland is possible. A very different matter is its realistic probability. Denmark, which holds sovereignty over the island – despite Greenland enjoying a very broad autonomous regime – does not appear willing to negotiate a territorial transfer of this magnitude. Nevertheless, the mere existence of this debate forces us to examine closely what exactly makes Greenland such a valuable geopolitical and economic asset.
The United States has maintained a significant presence in Greenland for decades, primarily through military bases. The Thule Air Base, located in the northwest of the island, is the most representative example. Built during the Cold War, this facility remains operational and is part of the U.S. defense and early-warning system. Beyond the military dimension, however, Greenland contains a set of natural assets that position it as a potential source of top-tier strategic resources.
The island’s subsoil contains materials that are critical to the technology industry and the energy transition. Notably, rare earth elements, including lanthanum, are used in the manufacture of electronic components, high-powered magnets, batteries, and wind turbines. Minerals such as lithium, copper, and graphite – essential for clean technologies and energy storage – are also present. These are complemented by traditionally valuable resources such as gold and other precious metals, as well as uranium, which holds major importance from both an energy and strategic standpoint.
In addition, Greenland may host significant reserves of oil and natural gas. Although these reserves are not currently exploited – largely due to environmental concerns and extreme operating conditions – their existence is well known. They could represent a future source of energy, particularly if global geopolitical or energy dynamics were to change in ways that reduce current barriers to exploitation.
That said, it is important to clarify that the mere presence of natural resources does not automatically imply profitable extraction. Greenland’s harsh climate, complex terrain, geographic isolation, and the need for specialized infrastructure make many of these projects technically challenging and financially uncertain. Profitability must therefore be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Even so, certain operations that may not be viable from a strictly financial perspective could still make sense from the standpoint of strategic autonomy. In an increasingly interdependent world – where access to critical raw materials has become a source of power – reducing reliance on third countries can be invaluable. The United States, for instance, is not among the leading producers of rare earths and depends heavily on countries such as China, Canada, and South Africa. In this context, having direct and secure access to these resources – even without immediate economic returns – can be a geopolitically sound strategy.
However, U.S. interest in Greenland goes well beyond raw materials. Its geostrategic value is enormous. Located in a key position in the North Atlantic, the island plays a fundamental role in NATO’s defense systems and in the broader architecture of Western security. During World War II, following the German occupation of Denmark, the United States established military bases in Greenland. This presence has continued ever since and was reinforced during the Cold War as part of the defensive strategy against the Soviet Union.
In particular, the so-called GIUK gap – connecting Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom – was essential to the deployment of the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), designed to detect Soviet submarine movements in the North Atlantic. This axis remains vital today, especially in the context of increased Russian military activity in the Arctic and the growing strategic importance of this ocean due to progressive ice melt and emerging global shipping routes.
Thus, effective U.S. control over Greenland already exists, albeit de facto rather than de jure. Existing military installations allow Washington to maintain a dominant position in the region without the need for formal territorial acquisition. This model – presence without sovereignty – is one the United States has implemented in many other parts of the world through an extensive network of strategic bases.
For all these reasons, the proposal to acquire Greenland should not be viewed merely as a political eccentricity, but rather as an expression of the convergence of economic, strategic, and military interests in a rapidly changing world. The Arctic Circle, once a geopolitical periphery, is becoming a central arena for competition over resources, trade routes, and strategic positioning. And on that chessboard, Greenland is undoubtedly a key piece.