Trump changed the security equation and now Europe must step up
12 FEB, 2026
By Kristofer Steneberg, Independent Journalist
America's new National Defense Strategy signals a historic break from decades of NATO-centered security policy. With Washington focused on denying China and Russia access to the Western Hemisphere, European nations face unprecedented pressure to defend themselves, says former commander of US Army forces in Europe, Ben Hodges.
”NATO has always been at the center of US strategic security thinking and arrangements. This has changed. The National Defense Strategy (presented in december 2025) specifically talks about less reliance on allies, which, while it's hard for me to even read those words, reflects the fact that the United States, even with the biggest defense budget in history, does not have enough capability to protect all of its interests”, Ben Hodges says.
The National Defense Strategy represents a fundamental reordering of American priorities. Where previous strategies placed NATO and European security at the center, the new document focuses on the Western Hemisphere and takes what officials call a more realistic view of what allies can be expected to contribute to their own defense.
”Europe is America's biggest trading partner. So it's obviously in our interest that Europe is prosperous, which means that Europe has to be stable and secure and have access to energy and raw materials and markets. The basis, the access that our allies give us across Europe, from the Arctic down to Africa into the Middle East, we depend on access for our air force, sea power, land forces, and intelligence sharing. That's also part of these relationships, which I think is at some risk”, Ben Hodges says.
During the Cold War, NATO members spent an average of 4 to 6 percent of GDP on defense. Between 2000 and 2022, the average fell to 1.5 to 2.0 percent, resulting in depleted stockpiles, aging platforms, and limited industrial capacity. But today the picture is different. European defense procurement is expected to grow at an average of 11 percent per year through 2035. Total spending over the period is estimated to exceed $4 trillion. The 2025 NATO summit in The Hague decided on binding commitments to reach 5 percent of GDP in defense spending by 2035. As an interim target, at least 3.5 percent of GDP should go to core defense expenditures. The question is whether increased investment is all that's needed. Ben Hodges says Europe lacks confidence and a coherent strategy:
”So far it has been too reactive. Europe needs to take command over its own agenda. And as long as Europe doesn't present a coherent grand strategy, it will be a victim of the great powers. It's not a lack of military capacity, rather it's about a lack of political courage to use the capacity Europe has,” Ben Hodges says.
”For this relationship to work, Europe cannot be subservient. Europe’s combined economies and wealth and technologies make it equal to any other great power….so add these together and act like a great power”.
The challenge though, extends beyond raw spending figures. European defense industries currently produce approximately 300 000 artillery shells annually, while Russia manufactures over 3 million. Production timelines for major weapons systems remain lengthy, with new fighter aircraft taking 7 to 10 years from order to delivery. The continent's fragmented procurement systems mean 27 EU member states operate 178 different weapon systems, compared to 30 in the United States, creating inefficiencies that no amount of spending can immediately overcome.
”You have to tell your parliaments what you're going to buy, when you're going to buy it, and how much you're going to spend. This is the hard part. It's one thing for a politician to say we're going to spend 3 percent of GDP on defense. It's another thing when they have to stand in front of their parliament and say, okay, we're going to buy this and this is how much it costs. That's when you're going to see if they're serious or not”, says Ben Hodges.
Russia has carried out hundreds of documented cyberattacks, sabotage operations and influence campaigns against European countries since 2022, targeting energy infrastructure, undersea cables, transport systems and political institutions, often below the threshold of armed conflict. Ben Hodges, with decades of service where he led US Army forces in Europe and held several key command roles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and NATO, has a clear view of what is going on:
”Russia clearly is at war with Europe. Even if they are not launching missiles at us, as they are in Ukraine, they are conducting war through other means. Until we figure out how to deal with these grey zone operations, we will continue to face sabotage, cyber-attacks and disruptions, from cables in the Baltic Sea to activity around Svalbard and elsewhere”, Ben Hodges says.
Europe can no longer treat security as a question of reassurance or symbolism. Deterrence is not built through statements or summits, but through capability, readiness and credibility over time, Ben Hodges argues. In a security environment defined by gray zones and permanent pressure, the absence of clear response options becomes an invitation rather than a safeguard.
”Putin does what every good chess player does. He reads his opponent and tries to understand what weaknesses and limitations they have. Then he exploits those limitations. The Kremlin only respects strength. They don't respect weakness, and hesitation is always perceived as weakness. That's why they continue to test the boundaries,” says Ben Hodges.
This is where the gap between swift political changes and military reality becomes most visible. While political signals shift rapidly, military planning operates on a different clock, one measured in years of training, procurement and integration. According to Hodges, the danger is not disagreement within the alliance, but the erosion of clarity about what will actually happen when thresholds are tested.
“At a military level, I don’t see any problems at all. Cooperation continues, planning continues, and command structures function. The problems are overwhelmingly political. We have to understand that relationships cannot be built on short-term reactions. Defense requires continuity and credibility over time”, Ben Hodges says.
That strategic gap is already visible on Europe’s northern flank. As Russian military presence grows in the High North and Arctic Sea routes open due to melting ice, geography that was once peripheral has moved to the center of European security planning. Decisions such as Sweden’s remilitarisation of Gotland, alongside increased focus on the Arctic, Nordkalotten and the GIUK gap, illustrate how deterrence must be built long before a crisis materialises.
”Sweden’s decision to put defenses back on Gotland was such an important step. Don’t wait until it’s threatened, but do it for deterrence, to secure a very important geographical location that’s important both for Sweden and for the alliance. That was a critical decision, and it shows the kind of thinking that is needed elsewhere as well”, Ben Hodges says.
“The Arctic has moved from the periphery to the center of strategic planning. Shrinking polar ice caps change shipping routes, missile trajectories and access to resources. You cannot defend Scandinavia or North America without understanding the Arctic”, he says.
Over 40 percent of Russia’s nuclear forces are based in the Arctic region, making the High North central to both deterrence and early-warning systems for Europe and North America.
”Ballistic missiles do not fly along political borders. They fly the shortest route, and that often goes over the Arctic. So if we want to protect populations in Scandinavia or North America, radar, sensors and missile defense in the Arctic become essential”, Ben Hodges says.
The Arctic Institute recently wrote: ”As ice retreats, the Arctic has shifted from a low-tension backwater to a contested strategic space, prompting updated military strategies. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2024 Arctic Strategy explicitly prioritizes enhanced capabilities, deeper ally engagement, and readiness for operations at high latitudes amid expanding Russian and Chinese activity”.
”Related to climate change, it will also become more and more feasible to access what is underneath the ice and the water, in terms of different types of rare earth minerals and resources that we all need. Naturally, that is going to create competition. And that competition has both a political and a military dimension”, Ben Hodges says.
Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the rest of the world, and projections suggest the region could experience its first mostly ice-free summer by around 2030. This has direct implications on security. In early 2026, NATO began planning an enhanced vigilance activity called Arctic Sentry to address regional security concerns, reflecting growing alliance focus on the High North amid tensions over Greenland and broader Arctic stability.
”You cannot defend Scandinavia or North America without understanding the Arctic. Radar, sensors, missile defence and the ability to operate in that environment all depend on it. This is no longer peripheral”, Ben Hodges says.
The controversy around Greenland is about power. Geography has forced the issue back onto the table, regardless of diplomatic discomfort. Security in the High North ultimately comes down to presence. And the US will be there, he says.
“We will probably end up reoccupying some of the locations we used to have in Greenland, working with Denmark and the Greenlanders. That will require rebuilding infrastructure, but if this really is about security, then that is exactly what needs to be done.”
For decades, Western defense industries operated on just-in-time principles: minimal inventories, global supply chains, and producing only what was ordered. This reduced costs but assumed conflicts would be short and predictable. The war in Ukraine shattered that. Artillery ammunition expected to last months was consumed in days, and European stockpiles proved insufficient for a long lasting conflict.
”The modernization of the acquisition and procurement processes so that we can share risk, collaborate, not only buying stuff but services, not only doing tenders but long-term relationships, investing in mutual risk”, Ben Hodges says.
Just-in-case thinking is about maintaining surge capacity, building strategic reserves, keeping production lines warm even without immediate orders. Readiness rather than efficiency.
”We have to change our thinking from just-in-time to just-in-case. The United States learned this lesson in 2017 when we realized that our defense industry could not produce enough for a high-intensity conflict”, says Ben Hodges.
The path forward requires a fundamental shift in how Europe approaches security: from reactive to proactive, from fragmented to coordinated, from efficiency to resilience. The question is no longer whether Europe can afford to take greater responsibility for its own defense, but whether it can afford not to.
”At the end of the day, why do you have defense? To protect your way of life”, Ben Hodges says.
”Our industries and economy need to be part of the solution to defend and uphold the rules-based order. We cannot exclude defense from that. We need to make a standpoint on what's right, on the values we believe. Otherwise, the opponents will say it's only talk.”
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