
23 SEPT, 2026
By Joanna Piwko from RankiaPro Europe

US President Donald Trump hosts Chinese President Xi Jinping at the White House on Thursday 24 September, the two leaders’ second summit this year after their May meeting in Beijing. Ahead of the Trump–Xi summit, Robert Gilhooly, senior emerging markets economist at Aberdeen Investments, is tempering expectations: ‘I do not expect many concrete measures to come out of the meeting between Presidents Xi and Trump.’
In his view, the talks will touch on artificial intelligence, export controls, Taiwan, Iranian oil and tariffs, with modest progress on trade the most likely tangible result.
Gilhooly sees room for a symbolic gesture on AI. ‘A dialogue or a memorandum on AI safety is plausible, but it will probably lack detail,’ he says. The groundwork is already visible: after meeting Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in New York on 20 September, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the two sides had discussed a US–China AI Dialogue, including a mechanism to notify each other of AI incidents that reach national-security level.
Washington’s appetite for binding rules is limited. ‘President Trump’s recent comments make it clear that he resists national regulations precisely to safeguard US leadership,’ Gilhooly notes. Beijing, for its part, will push for guarantees: ‘China will seek assurances that the US will not impose further export controls to curb its development, but it is unlikely to obtain anything more than cold comfort.’
The broader message is that the centre of gravity in the relationship has shifted. ‘Technology, more than trade, is becoming the main fault line in US–China relations,’ Gilhooly argues. He points to China’s progress in frontier large language models (LLMs) – which threatens US business models and amplifies cybersecurity concerns – as a sign that both sides are heading towards a new clash.
There is a way out, but Aberdeen does not expect Beijing to take it. ‘If Beijing prioritises applications over competition at the technological frontier, tensions could ease, but we believe the authorities have gained confidence in their ability to compete in that arena,’ he says.
For allocators, the tech rivalry already shapes portfolio decisions, from exposure to AI semiconductors to the AI and robotics names emerging in China.
Geopolitics will be handled quietly. Gilhooly considers that Taiwan is unlikely to appear in any official communiqué, although he expects ‘red lines’ to be stressed behind closed doors.
Similarly, little may be said publicly about the Middle East. Any attempt by Trump to pressure China to stop buying Iranian oil, or to win its tacit approval for US secondary sanctions, ‘will meet with firm resistance’, he warns. The White House also has reason to tread carefully: it will want to avoid any abrupt change in China’s oil purchases that could push prices higher before the midterm elections.
On trade, the preparatory meetings between Bessent and He Lifeng suggest some progress has already been made. According to Gilhooly, this could pave the way for lower tariffs on some non-sensitive goods, while China could offer to buy more US agricultural products, energy exports and Boeing aircraft.
A broader overhaul looks unlikely. ‘Neither side seems willing to radically readjust the trade relationship,’ he says, as threats to restrict exports of critical minerals offset the US administration’s desire to return to tariffs.
Taken together, Gilhooly’s expectations point to a summit that manages the rivalry rather than resolves it: symbolic language on AI, discreet handling of Taiwan and Iran, and a handful of targeted trade concessions.
The more durable signal lies in technology. With Beijing more confident in its ability to compete at the frontier and Washington unwilling to trade away its lead, the next flashpoint is more likely to be tech than tariffs.